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technique to detect possible breakpoints in the mean and the variance of credit spreads. 
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 1 Introduction
Understanding the dynamics of credit spreads is essential when pricing and hedging corpo-
rate bonds as well as the new generation of credit instruments such as credit derivatives
and structured products. An important issue is how to assess the systematic component in
the credit risk premium (Elton, et al., 2001; Allen and Saunders, 2003; Koopman, Lucas
and Klaassen, 2005). If credit spreads are signi￿cantly driven by a systematic factor, then
their time series should exhibit a countercyclical behavior. Previous work has brought to
light the negative serial correlation between credit spreads and macroeconomic conditions.
From this vein of the literature arises the recent debate on the relation between the credit
cycle and the economic cycle. The classical thinking is that the credit cycle is driven by
macroeconomic fundamentals (see for example Koopman and Lucas, 2005; Koopman et al.,
2006). However, Lown and Morgan (2006) have suggested that the credit cycle may also
a⁄ect the course of the economic cycle. To further investigate this relation, recent contri-
butions apply switching regime models to capture state dependent movements in the credit
spread dynamic (Davies, 2004 and 2007; Alexander and Kaeck, 2007; Dionne et al., 2007;
David, 2008). However, the connection between the states identi￿ed and the business cycle
remains unclear (Alexander and Kaeck, 2007). This paper readdresses this connection using
a di⁄erent approach.
The paper presents a nonparametric method ￿previously never applied in ￿nance ￿for
detecting regime shifts in the dynamics of the credit spread in real time. The proposed
approach has been applied in the physical and biological literature to detect regime shifts in
ecosystems (Rodionov, 2004, 2005, and 2006 for a complete review). It signals breakpoints in
the mean and the variance of time series coming into sequences based on structural statistical
tests. The technique has the advantage of letting the data speak and reveal possible shift
points in real time. In contrast to existing studies on credit spreads with regime switching,
it requires no assumptions about the number of the regimes. We apply this method to the
time series of credit spreads for a sample of U.S. bonds rated from AA to BB over the
1994￿ 2004 period.
Time series of credit spreads exhibit successive falling and rising episodes over time.
These episodes can be observed in changes in the level and/or the volatility of credit spreads
1especially around periods of economic recession and ￿nancial crises. A striking example is
shown in Figure 1. The ￿gure plots the time series of 3-, 5-, and 10-year AA to BB credit
spreads from 1994 to 2004. Our sample period covers the 2001 NBER recession (shaded
region). Across ratings and maturities, the credit spread movements exhibit at least two
di⁄erent regimes in terms of sudden changes in their level and/or the volatility over the
period considered. These shifts may be associated with a persistent ￿nancial crisis (Cerra
and Saxena, 2005; Hamilton, 2005) or sudden changes in the economy (Hamilton, 1988;
Sims and Zha, 2006; Davig, 2004).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Closer inspection of Figure 1 indicates that, just before the 2001 recession, credit spreads
shift from a falling episode to a rising episode. The rising episode characterizing the credit
cycle seems to be closely related to the economic cycle since both cycles appear to start
at almost the same time. However, the credit cycle seems to be longer than the economic
cycle. Actually, the NBER recession starts in March 2001 and ends after eight months in
November 2001 while credit spread levels remain high for several more years especially for
long maturity bonds. When applied to the 1991 recession, the same scenario can explain
the high credit spread level observed in late 1994. In addition, around the 2001 recession,
credit spreads for low grade bonds start to slope upward until mid-2003 and then take a
downward slope until the end of 2004. Since the end of the recession occurred in November
2001 but was o¢ cially announced in July 2003, an announcement e⁄ect might have triggered
the credit spread behavior in the high episode. These observations should have important
implications for credit risk management and for the regulation of banks. For example,
portfolio managers expecting an upcoming recession will know that this recession may well
be accompanied by a longer episode of high credit spreads.
Falling and rising episodes are driven by shifts either in the mean or in the variance of
the credit spread rates or in both. Techniques already used in the credit spread literature
consider the sample as a whole in their attempt to detect di⁄erent regimes. These techniques
take a con￿rmatory approach rather than an exploratory approach which control for the
number of the shifts in the data. For example, Davies (2004 and 2007) analyzes credit
2spread determinants using a Markov switching estimation technique with the assumption
of two volatility regimes. Alexander and Kaeck (2007) also use two-state Markov chains to
analyze credit default swap determinants within distinct volatility regimes. All these studies
use di⁄erent period ranges and may cover more than just two regimes.
The method applied in this study is based on sequential Student￿ s t￿tests for shifts in
the mean and on sequential F￿tests for shifts in the variance. For each new observation in
the data, we test the null hypothesis for possible regime shifts whether in the mean or in
the variance of credit spreads. The potential shifts are then con￿rmed if subsequent data
in the new regime pass a last con￿rmation test. This procedure is similar to the Sequential
T-test Analysis of Regime Shifts (STARS) method developed by Rodionov (2004). It also
incorporates the extension of Rodionov (2005 and 2006), in that it overcomes problems
related to the way test statistics deteriorate toward the ends of time series and also accounts
for outliers, serial correlation in the data, and any hidden noise process in the data that might
be mistaken for a process with di⁄erent regimes. For example, when the data generating
process contains a positive autoregressive component whose behavior looks like a process
with di⁄erent regimes, then any long falling and rising episodes observed in the data may
be mistaken for a change in the credit spread regime. Such hidden processes must therefore
be removed from the data before the regime shift detection technique is applied.
Our results show that mean regimes and volatility regimes have di⁄erent patterns but
they both occur around the 2001 economic recession as well as around most of the important
events that deeply a⁄ected the bond market in the period under analysis. Particularly, in
a recession, mean regimes come on gradually whereas variance regimes emerge in one shot.
Speci￿cally, at the beginning of the credit cycle, we observe a credit spread level e⁄ect as
well as a variance e⁄ect. Toward the end of the economic cycle, the variance e⁄ect will
weaken but the level e⁄ect is likely to persist until the announcement date of the recession￿ s
end. The combined e⁄ect of shifts in the mean and the variance of credit spreads produces
a credit cycle that is longer than the economic cycle even though both cycles start at almost
the same time.
On the other hand, our evidence shows that the economic cycle has a complex relation
with the entire rating structure of credit spreads. A level e⁄ect hits lower ratings early
3on, while shifts in the means of higher ratings are more contemporaneous with the o¢ cial
announcement of the recession. Further, these high ratings are also a⁄ected by a shift in the
variance. Then, when the NBER announces the end of the recession in retrospect, the means
of lower ratings start shifting downward. The whole rating structure of credit spreads will
return to its original regime only long after the end of the recession. We therefore ￿nd that
the credit spread dynamics is strongly persistent in the face of economic shocks and that
credit spreads with high ratings are particularly sticky. Indeed, this persistence of the credit
cycle over the economic cycle helps explain why previous studies have failed to agree about
the exact impact of systematic factors on credit spreads (Elton et al. 2001; Campbell and
Taksler, 2003; Elizalde, 2005; Avramov et al., 2007; among others). Our ￿ndings suggest
that, due to the persistence e⁄ect, this impact should change around the economic recession
and across ratings.
Finally, we test for the short-term market timing ability of the regime shift detection
technique applied to the mean. We show that portfolio returns obtained with structural
investment strategies based on the regime shift detection technique outperform (in most
cases) those obtained with strategies based on extreme values. More speci￿cally, the highest
returns are obtained with strategies based on regime shifts, whether these are detected and
not yet con￿rmed or detected and con￿rmed. Our results suggest that the regime shift
detection technique extracts valuable and economically signi￿cant information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the regime shift detection
technique. Section 3 describes the corporate bond data and the algorithm used to extract
the credit spread term structure. Section 4 discusses empirical results and application of
the method in market timing strategies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Regime shift detection technique
The procedure is based on the studies of Rodionov (2004, 2005, and 2006). We ￿rst ￿lter the
data by removing serial autocorrelation. At this step, we use the so-called ￿prewhitening￿
procedure to remove hidden noises generated by a stationary positive autoregressive process
in the data. These noises may be easily mistaken for di⁄erent regimes in the credit spread
series. Second, we use the ￿ltered data to make the test for shifts in the mean. Third, we
4remove shifts in the mean and test for shifts in the variance of credit spread residuals. All
these steps are described in this section.
2.1 The prewhitening procedure
Consider that credit spread series are described by a structural time series fYt;t = 1;2;:::;ng
that can be seen as the sum of a trend ft and an error term "t:
Yt = ft + "t; (1)
where "t are independently and normally distributed with zero mean and variance ￿2.
There is a breakpoint c between the current regime with mean ￿1 and the new regime with





￿1;t = 1;2;:::;c ￿ 1;
￿2;t = c;c + 1;:::;n:
(2)
The direct approach to regime shift detection is to formulate the null hypothesis: ￿1 =
￿2 = ￿ regarding the absence of a regime shift at t = c: After obtaining the estimates ^ ￿1; ^ ￿2;
and ^ ￿
2, the Student￿ s t￿test is then used to reject the null at the required probability level ￿.
Working with relatively short time series, it is hard to draw any de￿nitive conclusion about
the underlying process based on the data alone. Indeed, we can reject the null not because
credit spread series contain di⁄erent regimes but because they contain a noise process that
behaves like a process with di⁄erent regimes. This is known in the corresponding literature
as a red noise process. A stationary red noise process is usually modelled by a ￿rst order
autoregressive process (AR1):
Yt = ￿Yt￿1 + ￿0 + "t; (3)
where ￿0 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿. For the process to be stationary, it is necessary for the AR1
parameter ￿ to satisfy the condition j￿j < 1. With ￿ > 0, the process is a red noise. Each
realization of a red noise process creates extended intervals or runs where the time series
will remain above or below its mean value (Kendall and Stuart, 1966; Rudnick and Davis,
52003). These intervals can be misinterpreted as di⁄erent regimes. Therefore it is necessary
to either recalculate the signi￿cant level by taking into account the serial correlation or use
a prewhitening procedure, which consists in estimating properly the AR1 coe¢ cient (^ ￿) and
removing the red noises by using the di⁄erence (Yt ￿ ^ ￿Yt￿1):
Another problem arises when the time series contain regime shifts and a red noise, that
is, if the underlying model is:
Yt = ￿Yt￿1 + f0
t + "t (4)
where f0
t = ft ￿ ￿ft￿1. Then using all the available data to estimate ￿ would be mis-
leading. A possible solution to this problem is to use subsampling. The size of subsamples
should be chosen so that the majority of them do not contain change points. Assuming
that regime shifts occur at a regular interval of m months, this condition is satis￿ed if the
subsample size n is less than or equal to (m + 1)=3 (see Rodionov, 2006).1 In this case, the
estimate of ￿ can be chosen as the median value among the estimates for all subsamples.
In practice, however, ￿nding the right value of n requires some experimentation. After the
red noise is removed, the ￿ltered time series Zt = f0
t + "t can be processed with the regime
shift detection method described in Section 2.2.
The di¢ culty with the prewhitening procedure is to obtain an accurate estimate of
the AR1 coe¢ cient for short subsamples of size n since the traditional techniques such as
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) lead
to biased estimates for ￿. Therefore, two alternative methods are proposed in Rodionov
(2006): the MPK (Marriott-Pope and Kendall) and the IP4 (Inverse Proportionality with
4 corrections) techniques. The MPK technique is based on the formula of the bias in the
OLS estimate of AR1 (Marriott and Pope, 1954 and Kendall, 1954). The IP4 technique
is based on the assumption that the bias is approximately proportionate to the size of the
sample (Orcutt and Winokur, 1969, and Stine and Shaman, 1989). Both methods perform
better than the OLS and are similar to one another for n ￿ 10. Rodionov (2006) shows
that, based on Monte Carlo estimations, IP4 substantially outperforms MPK for smaller
subsamples. As we have a relatively small sample, we use the IP4 technique to estimate the
1For empirical application, we set n equal to the integer part of (m + 1)=3.
6autoregressive coe¢ cient.
2.2 Shifts in the mean
Let Z1;Z2;Z3;:::;Zi be the ￿ltered credit spread series with new data arriving regularly.
When a new observation arrives, a Student￿ s t￿test for the mean is performed to check
whether this new observation represents a statistically signi￿cant deviation from the mean
value of the current regime. We determine the di⁄erence diff between mean values of two
subsequent regimes that would be statistically signi￿cant at the level ￿mean according to






where m is the cut-o⁄ length of the regimes to be determined for the credit spread series
which is similar to the cut-o⁄ point in low-pass ￿ltering; t2m￿2
￿ is the value of the two-tailed
t￿distribution with (2m ￿ 2) degrees of freedom at the given probability level ￿mean. The
sample variance s2
m is assumed to be the same for both regimes and equal to the average
variance over the m￿month intervals in the time series fZtg: This makes diff constant for
the entire session with the given time series.





: At the current time tcur = tm + 1; the mean value of the new regime Znew
is unknown, but we know that to qualify for a shift to the new regime, it should be equal
or greater than the critical mean Z
"
crit, if the shift is upward, and equal or less than Z
#
crit,






crit = Zcur + diff;
Z
#
crit = Zcur ￿ diff:
(6)








range, then it is assumed that the current
regime has not changed and the null hypothesis H0 about the existence of a shift in the mean
at time tcur is rejected. In this case, the value Zcur is included in the current regime and the





crit, the month tcur is marked as a potential change point c, and subsequent data
are used to con￿rm or reject this hypothesis. The testing consists in calculating the Regime















is of the same sign as the one at the time of a regime shift, it
would increase the con￿dence that the shift did occur. The reverse is true if anomalies have
opposite signs. Therefore, if at any time during the testing period from tcur to tcur +m￿1
the RSI turns negative, when Zcrit = Z
"
crit, or positive, when Zcrit = Z
#
crit, the null
hypothesis about the existence of a shift in the mean at time tcur is rejected. In this case,
the value Zcur is included in the current regime, the RSI takes zero and the test continues
for the next value. Otherwise, the time tcur is declared a change point c and is signi￿cant at
least at the probability level ￿mean: The new regime becomes the base one, against which
the test will continue further.
2.3 Shifts in the variance
The procedure for detecting regime shifts in the variance is similar to the one for the mean,
except that it is based on the F￿test instead of the Student￿ s t￿test. We now assume that
the mean value of the time series is zero, that is, we work with the residuals f￿ig after
shifts in the mean are removed from the original time series fZt;t = 1;2;:::;ng: The F￿test






? F (￿1;￿2;￿var); (8)
where F (￿1;￿2;￿var) is the value of the F￿distribution with ￿1 and ￿2 degrees of
freedom and a signi￿cance level ￿var: In our application ￿1 = ￿2 = m ￿ 1: The variance
s2
cur is the sum of squares of ￿i, where i spans from the previous shift point in the variance
(which is the ￿rst point of the current regime) to i = tcur ￿1: At the current time tcur, the
8variance s2
new is unknown. For the new regime to be statistically di⁄erent from the current
regime, the variance s2
new should be equal or greater than the critical variance s
2"
crit, if the
current variance is increasing. However, if the current variance is decreasing, the variance
s2


























crit when the shift is down, this time is marked as a potential
shift point, and subsequent values ￿cur+1;￿cur+2;::: are used to verify this hypothesis. The












;j = tcur;tcur + 1;:::;tcur + m ￿ 1: (10)




crit; or positive, when s2
crit = s
2#
crit; the null hypothesis about the existence of
a shift in the variance at time tcur is rejected, and the value ￿cur is included in the current
regime. Otherwise, the time tcur is declared a change point c:
2.4 Handling outliers
Due to outliers, the average may not be representative for the mean value of the regimes,
and this may signi￿cantly a⁄ect the results of the regime shift detection. Ideally the weight
for the data value should be chosen such that it is small if that value is considered as an
outlier. Following Rodionov (2006), in order to reduce the e⁄ect of outliers, we use the
Huber￿ s weight function which is calculated as:
weight = min(1;h=[diff=￿]) (11)
where h is is the Huber parameter and [diff=￿] is the deviation from the expected mean
value of the new regime normalized by the standard deviation averaged for all consecutive
sections of the cut-o⁄length in the series. The weights are equal to one if [diff=￿] is less than
9or equal to the value of h. Otherwise, the weights are inversely proportional to the distance
from the expected mean value of the new regime. Once the timing of the regime shifts is
￿xed, the mean values of the regimes are assessed using the following iterative procedure.
First, the arithmetic mean is calculated as the initial estimate of the mean value of the
regime. Then a weighted mean is calculated with the weights determined by the distance
from that ￿rst estimate. The procedure is repeated one more time with the new estimate
of the regime mean. Since we expect that most shifts in the mean are closely related to
periods of NBER recession, the choice of the Huber parameter is challenging because most
signi￿cant picks in the credit spread rates occur around this period and should not be
considered as outliers. Thus, we repeat the procedures for a range of values of h from 1 to
10 (see robustness analysis in Section 4.4).
3 Data
3.1 Corporate bond data
To extract credit spreads curves for each rating class and maturity we use the Fixed Invest-
ment Securities Database (FISD) with US bond characteristics and the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) with US bond price transaction data. The FISD data-
base, provided by LJS Global Information Systems, Inc. includes descriptive information
about US issues and issuers (bonds characteristics, industry type, characteristics of embed-
ded options, historical credit ratings, bankruptcy events, auction details, etc.). The NAIC
database includes transactions by American insurance companies, which are major investors
in corporate bonds. Speci￿cally, transactions are made by three types of insurers: Life in-
surance companies, property and casualty insurance companies, and Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs). This database was recently used by Campbell and Taksler (2003),
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2004), and Bedendo et al. (2004).
Our sample is restricted to ￿xed-rate US dollar bonds in the industrial sector. We exclude
bonds with embedded options such as callable, putable or convertible bonds. We also exclude
bonds with remaining time-to-maturity below 1 year. With very short maturities, small price
measurement errors lead to large yield deviations, making credit spread estimates noisy.
10Bonds with more than 15 years of maturity are discarded since the swap rates that we use as
risk free rates have maturities below 15 years. We ￿nally exclude bonds with over-allotment
options, asset-backed and credit enhancements features and bonds associated with a pledge
security. Issuers credit ratings are reported by four rating agencies: Fitch Rating, Du⁄ and
Phelps Rating, Moody￿ s Rating and Standard and Poor￿ s Rating. We include all bonds
whose average Moody￿ s credit rating lies between AA and BB. AAA credit spreads are not
used because we ￿nd them negative for some periods. We also ￿nd that the average credit
spread for medium term AAA-rated bonds is higher than that of A-rated bonds. These same
remarks are noticed by Campbell and Taksler (2003) using the same database. We also ￿lter
out observations with missing trade details and ambiguous entries (ambiguous settlement
data, negative prices, negative time to maturities, etc.). In some cases, a transaction may
be reported twice in the database because it involves two insurance companies on the buy
and sell side. In this case, only one side is considered.
For the period ranging from 1994 to 2004, we account for 651 issuers with 2,860 outstand-
ing issues in the industrial sector corresponding to 85,764 di⁄erent trades. Since insurance
companies trade generally high quality bonds, most of the trades in our sample are made
with A and BBB rated bonds where they account respectively for 40.59% and 38.45% of
total trades. On average, bonds included in our sample are recently issued bonds with an
age of 4.3 years, a remaining time-to-maturity of 6.7 years and a duration of 5.61 years.
Table 1 reports summary statistics.
[Insert Table 1 here]
3.2 Credit spread curve
To obtain credit spread curves for di⁄erent ratings and maturities, we use the extended
Nelson-Siegel-Svensson speci￿cation (Svensson, 1995):
R(t;T) = ￿0 + ￿1
"




























11with "t;j ￿ N(0;￿2): R(t;T) is the continuously compounded zero-coupon rate at time t
with time to maturity T: ￿0 is the limit of R(t;T) as T goes to in￿nity and is regarded as the
long term yield. ￿1 is the limit of the spread R(t;T)￿￿0 as T goes to in￿nity and is regarded
as the long to short term spread. ￿2 and ￿3 give the curvature of the term structure. ￿1
and ￿2 measure the rate at which the short-term and medium-term components decay to
zero. Each month t we estimate the parameters vector ￿t = (￿0t;￿1t;￿2t;￿3t;￿1t;￿2t)
0 by
minimizing the sum of squared bond price errors over these parameters. We weigh each
pricing error by the inverse of the bond￿ s duration since long maturity bond prices are more
sensitive to interest rates:















where Pit is the observed price of the bond i at month t, PNS
it the estimated price of the
bond i at month t, Nt is the number of bonds traded at month t, N is the total number
of bonds in the sample, wi the bond￿ s i weight, and Di the modi￿ed Macaulay duration.
The speci￿cation of the weights is important because it consists in overweighting or under-
weighting some bonds in the minimization program to account for the heteroscedasticity
of the residuals. A small change in the short term zero coupon rate does not really a⁄ect
the prices of the bond. The variance of the residuals should be small for a short maturity.
Conversely, a small change in the long term zero coupon rate will have a larger impact on
prices suggesting a higher volatility of the residuals.
Credit spreads for corporate bonds paying a coupon is the di⁄erence between corporate
bond yields and benchmark risk free yields with the same maturities. Following Hull et al.
(2004), we use the swap rate curve less 10 basis points as a benchmark risk free curve. For
robustness, we also estimated the Treasury yield curve and found that curve parallel to the
swap curve (results are available upon request). So the choice of the benchmark should not
a⁄ect our results.
124 Results
4.1 Observed credit spreads
We obtain credit spread curves for AA rated to BB rated bonds with maturities ranging
from 1 to 15 years. Figure 1 ￿in the introduction ￿plots these results and Table 2 presents
summary statistics.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Across all maturities, the mean spread is 286 basis points and the median spread is 230
basis points. Higher mean and median spreads are due to the sample period selected which
includes the recession of 2001 and the residual impact of the 1991 recession re￿ ected in the
high level of the credit spread in 1994. Panels A to D present summary credit spread sta-
tistics for all, short, medium and long maturities, respectively. Investment grade bonds are
upward sloping for all maturity terms whereas speculative grade bonds are upward sloping
for short and medium terms and become downward sloping for long terms. Also, credit
spread standard deviations are clearly higher for speculative grade bonds across maturities
suggesting more variable and unstable yields for this bond group.
4.2 Regime shifts
First, we detect shifts in the mean. The cut-o⁄length is 12 months (m = 12). The probabil-
ity level for the null hypothesis is 5% for the mean and the variance (￿mean = ￿var = 5%).
The Huber parameter is ￿xed at 2 (h = 2). For the estimation of the AR1 coe¢ cient, the
subsample length is 4 months (n = 4). We discuss detailed results for 3-year and 10-year
A bonds as a benchmark for short and long maturity bonds then we report results for all
bonds in our sample. Figure 2 shows the results for shifts in the mean with and without
prewhitening for the 3-year and 10-year A spreads.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
In four cases, there are three common shifts in the mean detected at almost the same
period: a ￿rst negative shift in the late 1994 ￿ early 1995, one positive shift in the early 2001
13almost at the beginning of the NBER recession of March 2001 and a negative shift in the mid
2004 (Figure 2, Panel A and B). Thus, accounting only for the mean, these common shifts
suggest two di⁄erent mean regimes in credit spread dynamics over the period considered.
The 1994 ￿ 1995 negative shift in the mean signals a signi￿cant decrease in the level of
credit spreads (RSI < 0). A level around 0.7% for 3-year A spreads and 1% for 10-year A
spreads (Table 3). This low credit spread level also extends many months. The low level
regime length is between 75 (northeast region) and 78 (northwest region) months for 3-year
A spreads and between 71 (southeast region) and 76 (southwest region) months for 10-year
A spreads (Table 3).
[Insert Table 3 here]
The early 2001 positive shift occurred in March 2001 for 3-year A spreads and between
January and February 2001 for 10-year A spreads. This positive shift signals a signi￿cant
increase in the credit spread level at the beginning of the recession (RSI > 0). For example,
the 3-year credit spread mean shifts up from 0.7% to 3.15% in one shot (the northeast
region). However, before prewhitening (northwest region), the increase in the mean comes
in two steps to reach a 3.77% level in October 2001. This same pattern is observed for
10-year A spreads. In the southeast region, the 2001 positive shift drives the credit spread
mean from 1% to 3.94%. Still, before prewhitening, a ￿rst positive shift occurs in February
2001 increasing the mean to 2.77% and a second shift occurs in October 2001 boosting it
to 4.05%. Accounting for all 2001 positive shifts, the mean increases for up to 16 months
(northwest region) and 18 months (northeast region) for 3-year A spreads. This tendency is
more persistent for the long term spreads as the high mean extends 41 months in the case
of 10-year A spreads.
The second negative shift is detected in July 2002 (northwest region) and September
2002 (northeast region) for 3-year A spreads. Following this shift, the credit spread mean is
established around 2.4% which is still high relative to the 1994 level. A third negative shift
then follows in July 2004 for both cases, setting the mean at a level of 1.34%. On the other
side, we detect a single negative shift in the mean of 10-year A spreads in July 2004 driving
its level from 4.05% to 2.8% (southwest region) and from 3.9% to 2.9% (southeast region).
14Once again, long maturity spreads seem to remain high for more months than do short
maturity spreads. Moreover, we notice that when the positive shift is gradual ￿occuring in
two steps ￿the magnitude of the ￿rst shift seems to be higher than the magnitude of the
second shift (see the magnitude of the RSI before prewhitening in Table 3). Conversely
when the negative shift is gradual, the magnitude of the second shift is the highest (Table
3, Panel A).
The test for shifts in the variance is performed on the residuals after the stepwise trend
is removed (Figure 3).2 Results obtained for the variance have di⁄erent patterns than those
obtained for the mean. In contrast to the mean, the prewhitening procedure increases the
number of the shifts detected for the variance. Also, with this procedure, the magnitudes
of the shifts detected around the recession are bigger.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
In the southeast region of Figure 3, two negative shifts for the variance of 3-year A
spreads are detected before the recession. A ￿rst negative shock occured in December 1994,
dropping the variance level from 0.36% between January 1994 and November 1994 to 0.06%
after that period. Then a second negative shock of smaller magnitude came in August 1996,
setting the variance at 0.018%. The most serious shock, however, is detected in March 2001
at the beginning of the recession. The variance level jumps to 0.931% and stays high for 15
months until June 2002. After that, the variance level decreases to 0.157% in June 2003.
Before prewhitening of the same series (northeast region), we detect only three shifts. The
￿rst negative shift of August 1996 drives the variance to 0.064%￿ almost the same level as
that detected with prewhitening in the same month. Yet the second negative shift in August
2000 drops the variance very low (0.005%) for a period of six months, resembling the calm
before the storm. In February 2001, the third big positive shift signals the 2001 recession.
The variance level rises to 0.166%, very high relative to its level before that period but very
low relative to the level detected after prewhitening. One reason could be that the negative
shift of August 2000 has absorbed much of the credit spread variation between August 1996
and the beginning of the recession.
2We caution the reader to consider changes in the axis scale between Panel A and B.
15[Insert Table 4 here]
In the southwest region, the shifts detected for 10-year spreads are more dispersed. A
￿rst negative shift is detected in February 1995, driving the variance level from 0.740% (from
January 1994 to January 1995) to 0.114% (Table 4, Panel B, With Prewhitening). Another
negative shift is detected in June 1996, lowering the level to 0.025%. The ￿rst positive shock
increases the variance more than four times (0.153%) in February 1998. This is followed by
a negative shock occurring in February 1999, which re-sets the variance at an intermediate
level of 0.053%. Then the biggest positive shock in the variance occurs in January 2001, two
months before the beginning of the recession. The level of the variance shifts up to 0.408%
and stays there for 8 months. After that, the negative shift of September 2001 (0.063%)
re-establishes the variance at almost the same low level it had before the recession. Another
subsequent negative shift (detected in September 2002) drops the variance to its preceding
level of June 1996 (0.023%). This low variance level is maintained until May 2004. The
last positive shift then occurs in June 2004 driving the variance up to 0.261% where it
stays for the rest of the period. Almost the same pattern is observed before prewhitening
(northwest region)￿ and, even though showing fewer detected shifts and displaced locations,
it still holds. However, the biggest shifts of February 1998 and January 2001 are detected
at the same time with almost the same magnitudes and lengths of regimes. Once again,
just after the recession, a negative shift drops the variance level to 0.050% in October 2001.
Then, a last positive shift is only detected in December 2004.
As revealed by the shifts detected, we see that, especially around the 2001 recession,
the variance regime is quick and short, while the mean regime is gradual and long. It is
also interesting to see that the biggest shifts (for the mean and the variance) are detected
either in March 2001 (3-A ratings) or in January 2001 (10-year A ratings). However, the
NBER announces the start of the 2001 recession only in November 2001. This means that
credit spread series absorbed the distress of the bond market well before the announcement,
which provides an argument to support the fact that credit spread movements are driven
by systematic shocks (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001).
164.3 Can the shifts be related to economic cycles?
The aim of this section is to investigate the relation between patterns in the shifts of the
mean and the variance of credit spreads and the 2001 recession as de￿ned by the NBER. We
also examine how these shifts can be related to speci￿c ￿nancial events. Shifts in the mean
and the residual variance ￿ of di⁄erent ratings and maturities￿are reported, respectively, in
Figure 4 and Figure 5.
[Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5]
Over the period considered, the NBER reports a single recession beginning in March 2001
and ending in November 2001 (the o¢ cial announcement of the end of the cycle actually
occurred in July 2003). Figure 4 indicates that, for the mean, most of the upward shifts (14
out of 20) are concentrated in the three months around March 2001. This is strong evidence
that the beginning of the credit cycle roughly coincides with that of the economic cycle.
Our results fall in line with the ￿ndings of Koopman and Lucas (2005) who suggest that
risk premia on bonds contain a countercyclical component and that credit spreads are good
predictors for future business cycle conditions. Closer inspection of Figure 4 reveals that the
rising shifts for bonds with lower ratings (BBB and BB across all maturities) are gradual
and detected earlier. Typically, a ￿rst shock a⁄ects such riskier bonds few months before
the o¢ cial recession. Then, a second similar shock is felt within the recession period. This
￿nding suggests that the riskier bond spreads act as precursors of the economic cycle while
more investment grade spreads (AA and A) only join the wave at the start of the economic
recession. In the same spirit but di⁄erent context, Lown and Morgan (2006) investigate the
relation between ￿nancial market frictions and macroeconomic environment. Their general
￿nding is that the credit cycle can in￿ uence the course of the business cycle while the causal
connection remains unclear.
In addition, the credit cycle appears to last longer than the economic cycle. Since 1960,
the average length of the NBER recession is less than 11 months. Each of the previous
two recessions of 1991 and 2001 lasts 8 months. However, across all ratings and maturities,
downward shifts are detected more than 3 years after initial upward shifts. For AA and A-10
17year ratings, the downward shift is unique, suggesting strong persistence in the credit spread
dynamics. For lower ratings, the downward shifts are gradual with the ￿rst one occurring
around July 2003 ￿the NBER announcement that the recession ended in November 2001.
Notice that the positive shifts detected around September 2001 may also be accentuated
with the September 11 attacks which had a signi￿cant negative impact on the bond market.
Figure 5 shows that the NBER economic cycle and the shifts in the credit spread variance
are also related. Across ratings and maturities, we detect a positive shift in the variance at
or just before the recession and, in most cases (8 out of 12), we detect a negative shift after
this period. In addition, shifts in the variance are likely to suggest that the corporate bond
market anticipates well the coming period of recession. Thus, in four cases, the fears in the
bond market are translated to signi￿cant jumps in the credit spread variance in November
2000 (4 to 5 months before the recession). This applies to BBB spreads for all maturities
and 3-year BB spreads. Around the recession, in February 2001, eight positive shifts have
also been detected (see Table 5).
Another important ￿nding with shifts in the variance is that they are also detected
outside the 2001 recession. For example, a positive shift is detected in April 1997 for 5-year
A spreads and another positive shift is detected in March 1998 for the 10-year AA and
BBB spreads. We all know that this period su⁄ered from the consequences of the Asian
￿nancial crises of July 1997 which led to the stock market crash of October 1997. Another
positive shift is detected in October 1998 for 10-year BB spreads which also coincides with
the collapse of LTCM. These ￿ndings suggest that changes in the economy that a⁄ect the
￿nancial market may have played a role in the shifting of the volatility of our series (see for
example Rudebusch and Wu, 2007).
[Insert Table 5 here]
Overall, it clearly appears that the relation between economic cycle and the entire rating
structure of credit spreads is complex. A level e⁄ect is found to hit lower ratings early
on, then reaches higher ratings few months later￿before the o¢ cial announcement of the
recession. Further, these high ratings are also a⁄ected by a shift in the variance. Then,
when NBER announces the end of the recession retrospectively, lower ratings start showing
18downward shifts in their mean. The whole rating structure of credit spreads will shift back
to its original regime only long after the end of the recession. We therefore ￿nd that the
credit spread dynamics is particularly slow to respond to the end of the economic shock
and that the credit spreads of high ratings are particularly sticky. The persistence of the
credit cycle over the economic cycle can be viewed as a reason to why previous studies have
failed to agree about the exact impact of systematic factors on credit spreads (Elton et al.
2001; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Elizalde, 2005; Avramov et al., 2006; among others).
Our ￿ndings suggest that, due to the persistence e⁄ect, this impact should change around
the economic recession and across ratings.
4.4 Robustness analysis
In this section, we analyze the e⁄ect of the choice of parameters on the number of the
shifts detected for the means and the residual variances of credit spreads. The key set of
parameters is (m;￿mean;h); where m is the cut-o⁄ length, ￿mean is the signi￿cance level
for shifts in the mean, and h is the Huber parameter. The choice of the signi￿cance level for
shifts in the residual variance is less relevant at this step of the analysis since the number
and the magnitude of shifts detected in the residual variance depends on the size of the
residuals left after shifts in the mean have been removed. However, as the signi￿cance
level ￿var is low, the number of the shifts detected for the residual variance is reduced. In
Table 6, we compare the number and the location of shifts reported in Table 3 and Table 4
where m = 12;￿mean = 5%;h = 2; and ￿var = 5% with those obtained with each new set of
parameters (m;￿mean;h): Speci￿cally, we report the triplet (shifts unchanged, shifts added,
shifts dropped). Using the new parameters set, shifts unchanged count the number of shifts
detected in the same locations or +/- one month around locations reported in Table 3 and
Table 4. Shifts added count the number of shifts added outside these locations and shifts
dropped count the number of shifts dropped from these locations. The cut-o⁄length m takes
three possible values: 6 months, 12 months and 18 months. The signi￿cance level ￿mean
takes two possible values: 5% and 10%. For each combination of these two parameters,
we repeat the regime shift detection technique with and without prewhitening for di⁄erent
values of the Huber parameter: h = 1;2;3;5;10: The serial correlation is estimated for
19subsamples of size n equal to the integer part of (m + 1)=3: Overall, our results are robust
and they can be summarized as follows.
[Insert Table 6 here]
First, data values that are higher than h standard deviations are considered as outliers
and are weighted inversely proportional to their distance from the mean value of the new
regime: weight = min(1;h￿=diff): If the cut-o⁄ length m = 12 and the probability level
￿mean = 5%, the critical di⁄erence between the regimes diff = 0:85 ￿ ￿ which leads to a
weight = 1. As the cut-o⁄ length increases, the weight equals its limit value of one and the
results remain the same for di⁄erent values of h since all the data values have equal weights.
As shown in Table 6, when m ￿ 12, the number and the location of the shifts in the mean
remains unchanged for di⁄erent values of h. However, for shorter cut-o⁄ lengths and small
Huber parameters, for example m = 6 and h = 1, values higher than one standard deviation
will be weighted using weight = 0:78 at the 5% level. This has the e⁄ect to increase the
length of the current regime, as the diff increases for small cut-o⁄ lengths, and decrease
the number and the magnitude of the shifts in the mean. This case appears especially after
prewhitening for h = 1 since the procedure requires short subsample lengths. Second, as the
cut-o⁄ length increases, the degree of freedom also increases, which translates into smaller
diff and higher values of the RSI for the regimes of m months or longer. However, the
regimes shorter than the cut-o⁄ length can pass the test only if the magnitude of the shift
is high. For example, for 3-year A credit spreads, when the cut-o⁄ length increases from
6 months to 18 months, at least 4 shifts remain unchanged. This proves that the shifts
for the mean value of 3-year A spreads are determined correctly. On the other hand, the
lower the probability level, the higher the diff and the lower the RSI value which leads
to a lower number of shifts. Third, the number and the location of shifts for the residual
variance depend broadly on the size of the residuals left after shifts in the mean have been
removed. For example, when the magnitude of the shift in the mean is reduced, the size of
the residuals increases and the likelihood of a shift in the residual variance also increases.
This explains the movements in the triplet of the variance between shifts added and shifts
dropped for di⁄erent con￿dence levels and cut-o⁄ lengths.
20Finally, in comparing the procedure before and after prewhitening, it seems clear that
prewhitening reduces the magnitude and the number of regime shifts in the mean. Rodionov
(2006) used a Monte Carlo technique to evaluate this e⁄ect. He ￿nds that prewhitening is
a more conservative means of detecting regime shifts but has the advantage of reducing the
number of false alarms. As a consequence, the number of shifts detected for the residual
variance is often higher after prewhitening. Table 6 shows that, after prewhitening, most of
the shifts in the residual variance remain unchanged for di⁄erent set of parameters.
4.5 Market timing ability and regime shift detection
In this section, we assess the short-term market timing ability of the regime shift detection
technique. We investigate whether short-term market timing strategies based on the regime
shift detection technique can be more pro￿table than strategies based on extreme values.
Using 12 constant maturity portfolios of credit spreads corresponding to di⁄erent ratings
(AA to BB) and maturities (3, 5, and 10 years), we implement trading strategies that rely
on either shifts detected in credit spread means, or on extreme values of credit spreads.
The common investment rule across di⁄erent strategies can be summarized as follows.
Initial investment is set at $100. The investment strategy starts with a long position at
a time when observed prices are su¢ ciently low. Otherwise, invest the $100 in LIBOR 1
month for subsequent months and wait for a signal to move into a long position. When the
signal for the long position arrives, long x units of the credit spread portfolio and wait for a
signal to short position. When the signal for the short position arrives, short the x units of
the credit spread portfolio; invest in LIBOR 1 month for subsequent months and wait for a
signal to long position. When no signal is observed, then remain invested in the asset you
are holding.
In the regime shift detection technique, breakpoints are de￿nitely accepted after passing
two detection tests. The ￿rst test signals possible shift points based on the signi￿cant
di⁄erence between the means of the current regime and the new regime at the required level
￿mean. The second test con￿rms or rejects these possible shift points based on the value of
RSI. Both cases are considered here. In the ￿rst case, the investor always takes a position
when a possible shift point is detected and in the second case, the investor observes the
21possible shift point and waits until the shift is con￿rmed to take a position.
The market timing strategy based on the regime shift detection technique ￿hereafter
referred to as the structural strategy ￿depends on whether we take a position upon ￿rst
detection or upon con￿rmation of the shift. First detection strategy is based on comparing
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we remain in the current position. In the con￿rmed detection strategy, the signal to take a
long position is con￿rmed when RSI > 0 and the signal to short position is con￿rmed when
RSI < 0. Otherwise, when RSI = 0; no signal is con￿rmed and we remain in the current
position. Structural strategies assume the knowledge of the signi￿cant diff at which we
make the test for each new observation based on the two-tailed Student￿ s t￿test at the
required signi￿cance level, the average unconditional variance of regimes, and on the initial
cut-o⁄ length of the regimes. For robustness we use two possible cut-o⁄ lengths: 6 months
and 12 months.
Investment strategies based on extreme values were recently used by Berge and Ziemba
(2007) and Giot and Petitjean (2006). In the existing literature, extreme values are often
determined in an arbitrary way. Berge and Ziemba (2007), for example, test 44 di⁄erent
strategies depending on combinations of exit and entry threshold levels. In this section,
we alleviate concerns about data mining by setting the thresholds at the 5th and 20th
lower and higher percentiles of the unconditional distribution of credit spreads.3 Three
di⁄erent intervals are employed to de￿ne the critical values. These intervals are moving
windows of historical prices observed over one year, three years, and ￿ve years (i.e., 12, 36,
and 60 monthly observations). The combination of di⁄erent threshold levels and historical
interval lengths results in 6 di⁄erent investment strategies based on extreme values. The
long position is taken when the observed value of the credit spread is lower than the entry
threshold level, and the short position is taken when it is higher than the exit threshold
level. When the current value is between the exit and the entry threshold level, then the
current position remains unchanged.
3Results obtained with the 5th and 10th lower and higher percentiles are similar, thus we report only
one case.
22Notice that all the strategies involve constant maturity portfolios. Even though portfolios
with constant maturity credit spreads are not directly traded, they can be constructed by
using asset rebalancing to keep the portfolio duration constant. We do not account for
rebalancing costs since all the strategies described here are equally a⁄ected by them.
Portfolio returns along with the number of transactions corresponding to each strategy
are given in Panel A of Table 7 to Table 10. Across ratings and maturities, the structural
strategies are the winners in most of the cases: 8 out of 9 for AA spreads (Table 7, Panel
A), 8 out of 9 for A spreads (Table 8, Panel A), 9 out of 9 for BBB spreads (Table 9, Panel
A), and 9 out of 9 for BB spreads (Table 10, Panel A). For AA to BBB spreads, when the
initial cut-o⁄ length is set at 12 months (m = 12), the highest returns are shared between
the strategy based on shifts con￿rmed and the strategy based on possible shifts, whereas,
for BB spreads, returns obtained with the strategy based on possible shifts are always the
highest. In addition, the di⁄erence between the highest returns obtained with the structural
strategies and the highest returns obtained with strategies based on extreme values ranges
between 1% and 2% for AA to BBB spreads, while this di⁄erence goes up to 11% for BB
spreads (see for example the last row in Panel A of Table 10). Moreover, shifts in the mean
for spreads of lower ratings are shown to be detected earlier than shifts for higher ratings
(Figure 4). This in turn makes the structural strategy ￿ speci￿cally upon ￿rst detection
￿ more pro￿table for speculative grade bonds.
[Insert Table 7 to Table 10 here]
On the other hand, the highest returns obtained with the structural strategy based on
￿rst detection are supported by the large number of transaction that the strategy entails.
Actually, the structural strategy based on ￿rst detection counts up to 28 transactions over
the period considered while the strategy based on con￿rmed shifts counts at most 2 trans-
actions and the extreme values strategy counts up to 10 transactions. This big di⁄erence in
the number of transactions between di⁄erent strategies raises the issue of including the e⁄ect
of transaction costs. Thus, focusing on the strategy that is more economically pro￿table
should be a matter of concern.
Transaction costs are considered proportional to the value of the trade. When a trans-
23action occurs in a given month, the return on the portfolio for that month is reduced by the
cost of the transaction. However, introducing transaction costs will also reduce the number
of transactions, since threshold levels in the extreme values strategy and critical values in
the structural strategies are all considered in net values. Then, the dual e⁄ect of introducing
transaction costs will be the reduction of portfolio returns as well as the reduction of the
number of transactions. This makes the overall e⁄ect of transaction costs uncertain and
may lead to an increase in the ￿nal portfolio returns. To obtain net portfolio returns, we
multiply the gross terminal value of each strategy by (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ; where ￿ is the transaction
cost as a percentage of the total value of the transaction and ￿ is the number of transactions
according to signals given by the strategies.4 Following Berge and Ziemba (2007), we con-
sider two possible values for transaction costs: 0.5% and 1%. In terms of dollar values, the
upper bound (exit threshold) is divided by (1 + ￿) and the lower bound (entry threshold)
is divided by (1 ￿ ￿):
The introduction of transaction costs has negative and positive e⁄ects on portfolio re-
turns. Across di⁄erent strategies, the number of transactions is either left unchanged or
reduced (Panels B and C of Figure 7 to 10). However, in some cases, the portfolio return
is augmented because the introduction of transaction costs pushes the investor to be more
conservative (see for example the highest returns obtained with 3-year BB spreads in Table
10, Panel C). Even so, the structural strategy remains the most pro￿table overall.
With low transaction costs (￿ = 0:5%), movements in the highest returns are not frequent
and, in all cases, remain within the ￿ndings for structural strategies. For example, for AA
spreads, the highest return obtained with the ￿rst detection strategy and a cut-o⁄ length of
6 months moved to the 12 months cut-o⁄ length within the same strategy (Table 7, Panel
B). Also, for A spreads, we lost one highest return on the side of the con￿rmed shift strategy
and gained one highest return on the side of the ￿rst detection strategy (Table 8, Panel B).
The same pattern is observed for BBB spreads (Table 9, Panel B). For BB spreads, the gross
returns are high enough to keep them in the winners circle even after introducing higher
transaction costs (Table 10, Panel B and C).
When transaction costs are higher (￿ = 1%), the winners (i.e., the highest returns) most
4The net terminal value of each portfolio can be obtained using net returns and vice versa. Since returns




t ￿ ln(1 ￿ ￿):
24often move from the con￿rmed shift and the ￿rst detection strategies with 12-month cut-o⁄
lengths to the ￿rst detection strategy with a 6-month cut-o⁄ length (see for example Table
7, Panel C). The extreme values strategy wins only in three cases for A spreads (Table 8,
Panel C) and 2 cases for BBB spreads (Table 9, Panel C).
We also analyze the same returns with the buy-and-hold investment strategy. The
results are not reported here. Most of the portfolio returns obtained with the buy-and-
hold strategy are negative even when transaction costs are null. Unlike the extreme values
strategy, the buy-and-hold strategy involves two transactions like the structural strategy
based on con￿rmed shifts. Moreover, under the buy-and-hold strategy, the long position
is taken in late January 1999, well before the beginning of the recession and the short
position is taken in December 2004 after the recession ends. Nevertheless, it does appear
that the buy-and-hold strategy is not pro￿table, as it depends solely on portfolio values at
the beginning and the end of the investment window.
Overall, structural strategies based on ￿rst detection, which are more aggressive, outper-
form in most cases extreme values strategies, especially for lower ratings. Returns obtained
with the more conservative structural strategies based on con￿rmed shifts are also higher,
in most cases, than those obtained with extreme values strategies. Further, when transac-
tion costs are very high, the ￿rst detection strategy remains pro￿table especially for lower
ratings. Overall, the regime shift detection technique is shown to be valuable in market
timing.
5 Conclusion
Using an exploratory rather than a con￿rmatory approach, we test for shifts in the mean
and the variance of AA to BB credit spreads with maturities of 3, 5, and 10 years. Con-
trarily to the existing literature modeling switching regimes in the credit spread series, our
methodology detects possible breakpoints in the data in real time. Further, it does not
require any assumption about the number of the regimes.
Our results reveal that credit spread episodes are related to systematic components
driven by the economic recession and the ￿nancial crises. These systematic components
a⁄ect credit spreads in di⁄erent manners. The economic cycle triggers jumps in the level
25and the variance of credit spreads, whereas ￿nancial crises most often hit the variance.
Mean regimes appear to last longer and to move gradually between di⁄erent states, whereas
variance regimes are short and occur in one shot. Therefore, contrarily to the variance, the
mean e⁄ect remains signi￿cant after the o¢ cial recession and continues to increase until
the end of the recession is announced. Taken together, the mean and the variance regimes
characterize a credit cycle that lasts longer than the economic cycle. A noteworthy ￿nding
is that shifts in the variance ￿ while the evidence is weak￿ are also detected around most
￿nancial crises felt in the US economy during the period considered.
Our paper is aimed to be more descriptive than explanatory. As such, it raises more
questions than answers. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to a larger sample
data covering more than one economic recession. However, the challenge is to ￿nd a long
sample of bond transaction data. The unique comprehensive source with such data ￿NAIC
database ￿starts only in 1994.
Finally, the regime shift detection technique is shown to be valuable and economically
signi￿cant in the market timing of investment strategies. We show that, in the majority
of cases, more pro￿table portfolio returns are obtained with structural investment strate-
gies based on the regime shift detection technique. More speci￿cally, the highest returns
are obtained with structural strategies based on ￿rst detection, and returns obtained with
structural strategies based on con￿rmed shifts are very often higher than those obtained
with extreme values strategies. It is also shown that, even after accounting for very high
transaction costs, the structural strategy is still the winner. Our ￿ndings also suggest that
the structural strategy is more pro￿table for lower ratings in terms of dollar gains, essentially
because shifts in lower ratings are detected earlier than other ratings.
26References
[1] Alexander, C., and Kaeck, A. (2007), "Regime Dependent Determinants of Credit
Default Swap Spreads", Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 1008-1021.
[2] Allen, L., and Saunders, A. (2003), "A Survey of Cyclical E⁄ects in Credit Risk Mea-
surement Models, Technical Report", Working Paper, Bank for International Settle-
ments, 126.
[3] Avramov, D., Jostova, G., and Philipov, A. (2007), "Understanding Changes in Cor-
porate Credit Spreads", Financial Analysts Journal, 63, 90-105.
[4] Bedendo, M., Cathcart, L., and El-Jahel, L. (2004), "The Shape of the Term Struc-
ture of Credit Spreads: An Empirical Investigation", Working Paper, Imperial College
London, Tanaka Business School.
[5] Berge, K., and Ziemba, W. T. (2007), "The Predictive Ability of the Bond Stock
Earnings Yield Di⁄erential in US and Foreign Markets", R. Mehra (ed.), Handbook of
Investments: The Equity Risk Premium, Forthcoming.
[6] Campbell, J., and Taksler, B. (2003), "Equity Volatility and Corporate Bond Yields",
Journal of Finance, 58, 2321-2350.
[7] Cerra, V., and Saxena, S. (2005), "Did Output Recover from The Asian Crisis?",
International Monetary Fund, 52, 1-23.
[8] Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R. S. and Martin, J. S. (2001), "The Determinants of
Credit Spread Changes", Journal of Finance, 56, 2177-2208.
[9] David, A. (2008), "In￿ ation Uncertainty, Asset Valuations, and the Credit Spread
Puzzle", Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming.
[10] Davies, A. (2004), "Credit Spread Modelling with Regime Switching Techniques", Jour-
nal of Fixed Income, 14, 36-48.
[11] Davies, A. (2007), "Credit Spread Determinants: An 85 Year Perspective", Journal of
Financial Markets, 11, 180-197.
[12] Davig, T. (2004), "Regime Switching Debt and Taxation", Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 51, 837-859.
[13] Davydenko, S. A., and Strebulaev, I. A. (2004), "Strategic Actions and Credit Spreads:
An Empirical Investigation", Journal of Finance, 62, 2633-2671.
[14] Dionne, G., Gauthier, G., Hammami, K., Maurice, M. and Simonato, J. G. (2007),
"A Reduced Form Model of Default Spreads with Markov Switching Macroeconomic
Factors", Working Paper, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
[15] Elizalde, A. (2005), "Do We Need to Worry About Credit Risk Correlation?", Journal
of Fixed Income, 15, 42-59.
[16] Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., Agrawal, D., and Mann, C. (2001), "Explaining the Rate
Spread on Corporate Bonds", Journal of Finance, 56, 247-277.
[17] Giot, P., and Petitjean, M. (2006), "Short-Term Market Timing Using the Bond-Equity
Yield Ratio", CORE Discussion Paper No 2006/90.
27[18] Hamilton, J. D. (1988), "Rational-Expectations Econometric Analysis of Changes in
Regime: An Investigation of the Term Structure of Interest Rates", Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 12, 385-423.
[19] Hamilton, J. D. (2005), "What￿ s Real About the Business Cycle?", Federal Reserve
Bank of St-Louis Review, 87, 435-452.
[20] Hull, J., Predescu, M., and White, A. (2004), "The Relationship between Credit Default
Swap Spreads, Bond Yields, and Credit Rating Announcements", Journal of Banking
and Finance, 28, 2789-2811.
[21] Kendall, M. G. (1954), "Note On Bias in the Estimation of Autocorrelation", Bio-
metrika, 41, 403-404.
[22] Kendall, M. G., and Stuart, A. (1966), The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Volume 3,
Design and Analysis, and Time-Series, London, Charles Gri¢ n, 552pp.
[23] Koopman, S. J., and Lucas, A. (2005), "Business and Default Cycles for Credit Risk",
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20, 311-323.
[24] Koopman, S. J., Kraeussl, R., Lucas, A., and Monteiro, A. A. (2006), "Credit Cycles
and Macro Fundamentals", Working Paper.
[25] Koopman, S. J., Lucas, A., and Klaassen, P. (2005), "Empirical Credit Cycles and
Capital Bu⁄er Formation", Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 3159-3179.
[26] Lown, C., and Morgan, D. (2006), "The Credit Cycle and the Business Cycle: New
Findings Using the Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey", Journal of Money, Credit and Bank-
ing, 38, 1575-1597.
[27] Marriott, F. H. C., and Pope, J. A. (1954), "Bias in the Estimation of Autocorrelations",
Biometrika, 41, 390-402.
[28] Orcutt, G. H., and Winokur, H. S. Jr. (1969), "Autoregression: Inference, Estimation,
and Prediction", Econometrica, 37, 1-14.
[29] Rodionov, S. N. (2004), "A Sequential Algorithm for Testing Climate Regime Shifts",
Geophysical Research Letters, 31, L09204.
[30] Rodionov, S. N. (2005), "Detecting Regime Shifts in the Mean and Variance: Methods
and Speci￿c Examples", Workshop on Regime Shifts, Varna, Bulgaria, 68-72.
[31] Rodionov, S. N. (2006), "The Use of Prewhitening in Climate Regime Shift Detection",
Geophysical Research Letters, 31, L12707.
[32] Rudebusch, G., and Wu, T. (2007), "Accounting for a Shift in Term Structure Behavior
with No-Arbitrage and Macro-Finance", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39,
395-422.
[33] Rudnick, D. I., and Davis, R. E. (2003), "Red Noise and Regime Shifts", Deep-Sea
Research, 50, 691-699.
[34] Sims, C., and Zha, T. (2006), "Were There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary Policy?",
American Economic Review, 96, 54-81.
[35] Stine, R., and Shaman, P. (1989), "A Fixed Point Characterization for Bias of Autore-
gressive Estimators", The Annals of Statistics, 17, 1275-1284.
28[36] Svensson, L. (1995), "Estimating Forward Rates with the Extended Nelson and Siegel
Method", Sveriges Riksbank Quarterly Review, 3, 13-26.
29Table 1: Summary statistics for US corporate bonds.
The maturity is the number of years until the maturity date, upon issuance. The duration is the modi￿ed
Macaulay duration in years. The size is the total dollar amount issued. The volume is the total dollar
amount traded. Issues are the number of unique issues. Issuers are the number of unique issuers. Trades
are the number of unique trades. Trades are percentages of total trades within each bond category (AA to
BB).
Variable Number Mean St. Dev Min Max
Coupon ($) 7.398 1.201 0.900 15.000
Age (years) 4.305 3.148 0.083 21.569
Maturity (years) 6.699 4.302 1.000 15.000
Duration (years) 5.607 3.065 0.707 14.756
Size ($) 3.37￿105 4.73￿105 0.10￿105 1.00￿108
Volume ($) 3.72￿106 6.04￿106 0.10￿105 1.78￿108
Issuers 651
Issues 2,860






30Table 2: Summary statistics on credit spreads.
This table reports summary statistics on credit spreads for straight ￿xed-coupon corporate bonds in the
industrial sector, over the period 1994-2004, by rating and remaining maturity. The benchmark risk-free
yield is the swap curve less 10 basis points ￿tted to all maturities using the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson algorithm.
The spreads are given as annualized yields in basis points.
All AA A BBB BB
Panel A: Spreads for all maturities
Mean 286 147 167 226 333
Median 230 98 122 171 271
St. Dev. 159 113 107 132 184
5% quantile 109 20 49 84 126
95% quantile 583 353 357 475 690
Panel B: Spreads for maturity 1-3 years
Mean 260 97 131 196 330
Median 196 68 91 145 267
St. Dev. 172 81 94 132 218
5% quantile 75 7 31 52 96
95% quantile 596 267 320 460 746
Panel C : Spreads for maturity 3-7 years
Mean 293 146 174 230 360
Median 231 96 119 173 293
St. Dev. 164 112 117 138 191
5% quantile 116 22 50 76 145
95% quantile 614 363 393 501 733
Panel D : Spreads for maturity 7-15 years
Mean 291 170 175 233 326
Median 240 111 131 178 265
St. Dev. 153 128 107 130 173
5% quantile 117 26 54 96 130
95% quantile 569 387 357 472 661
31Table 3: Changing points for shifts in the mean of 3- and 10-year spreads.
This table reports months of shifts in the credit spread means, credit spread means in each regime, regimes
length in month, and the Regime Shift Index (RSI). The period considered spans from Jan-94 to Dec-04,
the signi￿cance level is 0.05 and the cuto⁄ length is 12 months.
Without prewhitening With prewhitening
Shift Mean Length RSI Shift Mean Length RSI
point (%) (mth) point (%) (mth)
Panel A: 3-year A bonds
Sep-94 0.704 78 -1.247 Dec-94 0.684 75 -0.178
Mar-01 2.103 7 3.028 Mar-01 3.149 18 2.522
Oct-01 3.767 9 0.849 Sep-02 2.426 22 -0.416
Jul-02 2.489 24 -1.396 Jul-04 1.388 6 -1.078
Jul-04 1.389 6 -1.601
Panel B: 10-year A bonds
Oct-94 1.082 76 -1.481 Feb-95 1.058 71 -0.263
Feb-01 2.775 8 3.365 Jan-01 3.936 41 1.266
Oct-01 4.054 33 1.103 Jun-04 2.936 7 -0.982
Jul-04 2.798 6 -1.818
32Table 4: Changing points for shifts in the variance of 3- and 10-year spreads.
This table reports months of shifts in the zero mean credit spread variances, zero mean credit spread
variances in each regime, regimes length in month, and the Residual Sum of Squares Index Sum (RSSI).
The period considered spans from Jan-94 to Dec-04, the signi￿cance level is 0.05 and the cut-o⁄ length is
12 months.
Without prewhitening With prewhitening
Shift Mean Length RSSI Shift Mean Length RSSI
point (%) (mth) point (%) (mth)
Panel A: 3-year A bonds
Aug-96 0.064 48 -0.006 Dec-94 0.060 20 -0.048
Aug-00 0.005 6 -0.006 Aug-96 0.058 55 -0.003
Feb-01 0.166 47 0.176 Mar-01 0.931 15 0.750
Jun-02 0.157 31 -0.186
Panel B: 10-year A bonds
Apr-96 0.028 22 -0.037 Feb-95 0.114 16 -0.027
Feb-98 0.153 12 0.076 Jun-96 0.025 20 -0.031
Feb-99 0.014 23 -0.008 Feb-98 0.153 12 0.084
Jan-01 0.370 9 0.101 Feb-99 0.053 23 -0.001
Oct-01 0.050 38 -0.007 Jan-01 0.408 8 1.348
Dec-04 0.391 1 0.018 Sep-01 0.063 12 -0.314
Sep-02 0.023 21 -0.015













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 6: Sensitivity analysis for model parameters.
We compare the number and the location of shifts reported in Table 3 and Table 4 where
m = 12;￿mean= 0:05; and h = 2 with those obtained for each new set of parameter through the triplet
(shifts unchanged, shifts added, shifts dropped). The parameter m is the cut-o⁄ length, ￿mean is the
signi￿cance level for shifts in the mean, and h is the Huber parameter. The signi￿cance level for shifts in
the variance is ￿var= 0:05 and the subsample size for serial correlation n is equal to the integer part of
(m + 1)=3: The case analyzed in the paper is in box.
Without prewhitening With prewhitening
Mean Variance Mean Variance
m ￿ h A-3 A-10 A-3 A-10 A-3 A-10 A-3 A-10
yrs yrs yrs yrs yrs yrs yrs yrs
6 0.05 1 (4,2,0) (3,1,0) (1,0,2) (4,2,2) (4,1,0) (3,0,0) (2,1,2) (6,1,2)
6 0.05 2 (5,1,0) (4,0,0) (2,0,1) (4,2,2) (4,1,0) (3,0,0) (2,1,2) (5,1,3)
6 0.05 3 (5,1,0) (4,0,0) (2,0,1) (4,2,2) (4,1,0) (3,0,0) (2,0,2) (3,0,5)
6 0.05 5 (5,1,0) (4,0,0) (2,0,1) (4,2,2) (4,1,0) (3,0,0) (2,0,2) (3,0,5)
6 0.05 10 (5,1,0) (4,0,0) (2,0,1) (4,2,2) (4,1,0) (3,0,0) (2,0,2) (3,0,5)
6 0.10 1 (5,4,0) (4,5,0) (1,0,2) (4,4,2) (4,4,0) (3,1,0) (2,3,2) (8,2,0)
6 0.10 2 (5,4,0) (4,6,0) (2,0,1) (4,4,2) (4,3,0) (3,0,0) (2,2,2) (8,0,0)
6 0.10 3 (5,4,0) (4,6,0) (2,0,1) (4,4,2) (4,3,0) (3,0,0) (2,2,2) (8,0,0)
6 0.10 5 (5,4,0) (4,6,0) (2,0,1) (4,4,2) (4,3,0) (3,0,0) (2,2,2) (8,0,0)
6 0.10 10 (5,4,0) (4,6,0) (2,0,1) (4,4,2) (4,3,0) (3,0,0) (2,2,2) (8,0,0)
12 0.05 1 (5,0,0) (4,0,0) (2,0,1) (4,0,2) (4,0,0) (2,0,1) (4,0,0) (7,1,1)
12 0.05 2 (5,0,0) (4,0,0) (3,0,0) (6,0,0) (4,0,0) (3,0,0) (4,0,0) (8,0,0)
12 0.05 3 (5,0,0) (4,0,0) (3,0,0) (6,0,0) (4,0,0) (3,0,0) (4,0,0) (8,0,0)
12 0.05 5 (5,0,0) (4,0,0) (3,0,0) (6,0,0) (4,0,0) (3,0,0) (4,0,0) (7,1,1)
12 0.05 10 (5,0,0) (4,0,0) (3,0,0) (6,0,0) (4,0,0) (3,0,0) (4,0,0) (6,1,2)
12 0.10 1 (5,2,0) (4,0,0) (2,1,1) (5,2,1) (3,2,1) (3,0,0) (3,2,1) (7,1,1)
12 0.10 2 (5,2,0) (4,0,0) (3,1,0) (5,3,1) (4,1,0) (3,0,0) (3,1,1) (6,2,2)
12 0.10 3 (5,2,0) (4,0,0) (3,1,0) (5,3,1) (4,1,0) (3,0,0) (3,1,1) (6,2,2)
12 0.10 5 (5,2,0) (4,0,0) (3,1,0) (5,3,1) (4,1,0) (3,0,0) (3,1,1) (6,2,2)
12 0.10 10 (5,2,0) (4,0,0) (3,1,0) (5,3,1) (4,1,0) (3,0,0) (3,1,1) (6,2,2)
18 0.05 1 (4,0,1) (4,0,0) (2,2,1) (4,1,2) (3,0,1) (2,0,1) (3,1,1) (6,2,2)
18 0.05 2 (4,0,1) (4,0,0) (2,2,1) (3,1,2) (3,0,1) (2,0,1) (3,0,1) (6,2,2)
18 0.05 3 (4,0,1) (4,0,0) (2,2,1) (3,1,2) (3,0,1) (2,0,1) (3,0,1) (6,2,2)
18 0.05 5 (4,0,1) (4,0,0) (2,2,1) (3,1,2) (3,0,1) (2,0,1) (3,0,1) (5,2,3)
18 0.05 10 (4,0,1) (4,0,0) (2,2,1) (3,1,2) (3,0,1) (2,0,1) (3,0,1) (5,2,3)
18 0.10 1 (4,0,1) (4,1,0) (2,1,1) (4,1,2) (3,1,1) (2,0,1) (4,2,0) (7,0,1)
18 0.10 2 (4,0,1) (4,1,0) (2,1,1) (4,1,2) (3,1,1) (2,0,1) (4,1,0) (6,0,2)
18 0.10 3 (4,0,1) (4,1,0) (2,1,1) (4,1,2) (3,1,1) (2,0,1) (3,1,1) (6,0,2)
18 0.10 5 (4,0,1) (4,1,0) (2,1,1) (4,1,2) (3,1,1) (2,0,1) (3,1,1) (6,0,2)
18 0.10 10 (4,0,1) (4,1,0) (2,1,1) (4,1,2) (3,1,1) (2,0,1) (3,1,1) (6,0,2)
35Table 7: Market timing based on regime shift detection technique and extreme values
(Rating = AA).
Column 1 reports selected maturities of 3, 5, and 10 years (Tm). Column 2 reports the number of months of the
moving windows used to estimate extreme values (Hist.). Following columns report portfolio returns (Ret.) and
number of transactions (Nb.) for each strategy. Structural strategies are based on shifts con￿rmed with the value
of RSI at the 5% level or possible shifts when they are detected but not yet con￿rmed. Initial cut-o⁄ lengths m
in the structural strategy are 6 or 12 months. Extreme Values (EV) for entry and exit threshold are taken from
the 5th and 20th lower and higher percentiles. Panels A, B, and C present the results when transaction costs are
respectively 0.0%, 0.5%, and 1.0%. The highest return, across di⁄erent strategies, is underlined.
Structural based Structural based EV EV
on shifts con￿rmed on possible shifts [20%, 80%] [5%, 95%]
Tm Hist. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb.
m=12 m=6 m=12 m=6
Panel A: Transaction cost = 0.0%
3 12 4.05 2 4.26 2 3.47 15 3.31 11 2.34 10 2.84 8
3 36 3.62 2 3.88 2 3.59 11 2.88 8 1.79 8 2.42 6
3 60 2.95 2 3.30 2 3.26 11 2.71 8 1.31 6 1.70 6
5 12 2.88 2 3.75 1 3.99 18 4.00 10 2.90 8 2.90 8
5 36 2.15 2 3.25 1 4.10 18 3.27 10 2.44 6 2.44 6
5 60 0.99 2 2.46 1 4.96 16 2.49 10 2.26 6 2.26 6
10 12 0.90 2 0.90 2 3.80 20 1.97 10 1.99 10 2.94 10
10 36 -0.32 2 -0.32 2 2.43 16 1.29 10 0.96 8 2.14 8
10 60 -2.30 2 -2.30 2 0.99 14 -0.47 8 0.40 8 1.98 8
Panel B: Transaction cost = 0.5%
3 12 4.04 2 4.25 2 3.40 15 2.92 11 3.21 6 2.66 4
3 36 3.61 2 3.87 2 3.52 11 2.98 8 2.57 6 1.88 4
3 60 2.94 2 3.28 2 3.17 11 2.64 8 1.91 6 0.63 4
5 12 2.87 2 3.75 1 3.90 18 3.72 10 2.58 8 3.01 4
5 36 2.14 2 3.24 1 4.36 16 3.21 10 2.06 6 2.32 4
5 60 0.98 2 2.45 1 4.83 16 3.96 10 1.76 6 1.83 4
10 12 0.89 2 0.89 2 3.70 20 1.92 10 2.28 10 1.94 8
10 36 -0.33 2 -0.33 2 2.33 16 1.23 10 1.44 8 1.02 6
10 60 -2.32 2 -2.32 2 0.87 14 -1.74 6 1.40 8 0.49 6
Panel C: Transaction cost = 1.0%
3 12 3.85 2 4.06 2 2.13 3 4.38 2 2.45 4 3.85 2
3 36 3.37 2 3.63 2 1.22 3 4.03 2 1.63 4 3.37 2
3 60 2.62 2 2.96 2 2.14 3 3.51 2 0.29 4 2.62 2
5 12 2.67 2 3.65 1 4.37 7 1.83 3 2.80 6 2.20 2
5 36 1.90 2 3.12 1 4.38 6 0.85 3 2.06 6 1.31 2
5 60 0.66 2 2.29 1 3.97 6 -0.74 3 1.48 6 -0.13 2
10 12 0.70 2 0.70 2 0.91 10 4.28 4 2.37 10 1.72 8
10 36 -0.57 2 -0.57 2 -0.04 12 3.90 4 1.68 8 0.64 6
10 60 -2.63 2 -2.63 2 -1.91 10 3.33 4 1.36 8 -0.02 6
36Table 8: Market timing based on regime shift detection technique and extreme values
(Rating = A).
Column 1 reports selected maturities of 3, 5, and 10 years (Tm). Column 2 reports the number of months of the
moving windows used to estimate extreme values (Hist.). Following columns report portfolio returns (Ret.) and
number of transactions (Nb.) for each strategy. Structural strategies are based on shifts con￿rmed with the value
of RSI at the 5% level or possible shifts when they are detected but not yet con￿rmed. Initial cut-o⁄ lengths m
in the structural strategy are 6 or 12 months. Extreme Values (EV) for entry and exit threshold are taken from
the 5th and 20th lower and higher percentiles. Panels A, B, and C present the results when transaction costs are
respectively 0.0%, 0.5%, and 1.0%. The highest return, across di⁄erent strategies, is underlined.
Structural based Structural based EV EV
on shifts con￿rmed on possible shifts [20%, 80%] [5%, 95%]
Tm Hist. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb.
m=12 m=6 m=12 m=6
Panel A: Transaction cost = 0.0%
3 12 3.51 2 3.32 2 3.11 14 2.45 8 2.45 12 3.14 8
3 36 2.94 2 2.70 2 2.34 10 1.70 6 1.94 10 2.71 6
3 60 2.04 2 1.73 2 1.58 8 1.10 6 1.37 8 2.35 6
5 12 2.51 2 2.67 2 3.77 16 2.60 12 2.65 10 2.74 8
5 36 1.69 2 1.90 2 2.94 12 0.57 6 1.96 8 2.07 6
5 60 0.38 2 0.66 2 3.59 12 -0.16 8 1.53 8 1.68 6
10 12 -2.87 2 -2.87 2 4.53 28 1.54 8 1.19 8 1.32 8
10 36 0.27 2 0.27 2 3.80 22 0.26 6 -0.37 6 -0.21 6
10 60 -1.51 2 -1.51 2 2.98 20 -0.67 6 -1.24 6 -1.02 6
Panel B: Transaction cost = 0.5%
3 12 3.50 2 3.31 2 3.95 14 0.98 6 3.09 8 0.85 4
3 36 2.93 2 2.69 2 2.06 8 1.66 6 2.62 6 1.50 4
3 60 2.03 2 1.71 2 1.51 8 1.17 6 1.87 6 2.56 4
5 12 2.50 2 2.66 2 3.69 16 2.54 12 2.50 8 2.05 6
5 36 1.68 2 1.89 2 3.48 12 0.53 6 1.90 6 1.15 4
5 60 0.36 2 0.64 2 2.82 10 -0.22 8 1.45 6 -0.07 4
10 12 -2.88 2 -2.88 2 4.15 26 1.50 8 0.92 8 0.98 8
10 36 0.26 2 0.26 2 3.67 22 0.22 6 -0.59 6 -0.05 6
10 60 -1.53 2 -1.53 2 2.81 20 -1.23 4 -1.52 6 -1.72 4
Panel C: Transaction cost = 1.0%
3 12 3.31 2 3.12 2 2.00 3 2.39 1 1.89 6 3.22 3
3 36 2.69 2 2.45 2 1.06 3 1.55 1 1.25 4 2.58 3
3 60 1.71 2 1.39 2 0.19 1 2.29 1 0.04 4 1.57 3
5 12 2.31 2 2.47 2 2.44 7 0.93 5 2.58 8 2.00 4
5 36 1.44 2 1.65 2 1.20 5 -0.49 3 1.93 6 1.06 4
5 60 0.05 2 0.32 2 -0.02 3 0.19 1 0.98 6 2.68 4
10 12 -3.07 2 -3.07 2 1.10 12 3.97 4 0.58 8 0.93 6
10 36 0.02 2 0.02 2 -0.48 8 3.51 4 -0.88 6 -0.44 4
10 60 -1.84 2 -1.84 2 -1.86 6 3.47 2 -1.91 6 -1.84 2
37Table 9: Market timing based on regime shift detection technique and extreme values
(Rating = BBB).
Column 1 reports selected maturities of 3, 5, and 10 years (Tm). Column 2 reports the number of months of the
moving windows used to estimate extreme values (Hist.). Following columns report portfolio returns (Ret.) and
number of transactions (Nb.) for each strategy. Structural strategies are based on shifts con￿rmed with the value
of RSI at the 5% level or possible shifts when they are detected but not yet con￿rmed. Initial cut-o⁄ lengths m
in the structural strategy are 6 or 12 months. Extreme Values (EV) for entry and exit threshold are taken from
the 5th and 20th lower and higher percentiles. Panels A, B, and C present the results when transaction costs are
respectively 0.0%, 0.5%, and 1.0%. The highest return, across di⁄erent strategies, is underlined.
Structural based Structural based EV EV
on shifts con￿rmed on possible shifts [20%, 80%] [5%, 95%]
Tm Hist. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb.
m=12 m=6 m=12 m=6
Panel A: Transaction cost = 0.0%
3 12 2.96 2 2.96 2 1.71 13 0.73 8 2.19 8 2.32 8
3 36 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.19 9 1.08 4 1.40 6 1.55 6
3 60 1.13 2 1.13 2 1.70 9 0.88 4 0.79 6 0.79 6
5 12 2.11 2 2.23 2 0.98 10 -0.07 6 1.75 8 1.66 6
5 36 1.19 2 1.34 2 1.88 10 0.58 6 0.72 6 0.60 4
5 60 -0.29 2 -0.08 2 2.56 8 4.25 2 -0.19 6 -0.35 4
10 12 -1.11 2 1.33 2 4.75 17 3.47 11 -0.52 6 -0.18 6
10 36 -2.83 2 0.22 2 4.03 15 2.17 11 -2.09 4 -1.66 4
10 60 -2.22 2 -1.58 2 5.51 13 1.17 9 -3.15 4 -2.72 2
Panel B: Transaction cost = 0.5%
3 12 2.95 2 2.95 2 1.51 11 0.33 6 1.46 6 0.06 2
3 36 2.24 2 2.24 2 2.13 9 1.06 4 0.60 4 0.60 2
3 60 1.11 2 1.11 2 1.63 9 0.85 4 -0.48 4 1.12 2
5 12 2.10 2 2.22 2 0.93 10 -0.10 6 1.36 6 1.48 6
5 36 1.18 2 1.33 2 1.33 8 0.54 6 0.35 4 0.46 4
5 60 -0.30 2 -0.10 2 3.04 8 4.23 2 -0.68 4 -0.10 2
10 12 -1.12 2 1.32 2 4.67 17 3.41 11 -0.09 6 0.01 6
10 36 -2.84 2 0.21 2 4.97 13 2.11 11 -1.42 4 -1.42 4
10 60 -2.24 2 -1.59 2 5.40 13 1.09 9 -2.92 4 -2.88 2
Panel C: Transaction cost = 1.0%
3 12 2.75 2 2.75 2 3.02 4 2.46 4 -0.04 2 3.17 2
3 36 2.00 2 2.00 2 1.26 4 1.87 2 0.48 2 2.52 2
3 60 0.79 2 0.79 2 1.44 4 3.12 0 -1.02 2 1.49 2
5 12 1.91 2 2.03 2 2.22 6 4.63 2 1.18 6 -0.66 2
5 36 0.94 2 1.09 2 0.48 6 3.75 0 0.20 4 -0.72 2
5 60 -0.62 2 -0.42 2 3.15 6 3.12 0 -0.88 4 0.07 2
10 12 -1.31 2 1.13 2 4.28 13 2.08 9 -0.30 6 0.25 6
10 36 -3.08 2 -0.03 2 2.90 11 1.51 11 -1.67 4 -1.24 4
10 60 -2.56 2 -1.91 2 3.11 11 2.08 6 -3.05 2 -3.05 2
38Table 10: Market timing based on regime shift detection technique and extreme values
(Rating = BB).
Column 1 reports selected maturities of 3, 5, and 10 years (Tm). Column 2 reports the number of months of the
moving windows used to estimate extreme values (Hist.). Following columns report portfolio returns (Ret.) and
number of transactions (Nb.) for each strategy. Structural strategies are based on shifts con￿rmed with the value
of RSI at the 5% level or possible shifts when they are detected but not yet con￿rmed. Initial cut-o⁄ lengths m
in the structural strategy are 6 or 12 months. Extreme Values (EV) for entry and exit threshold are taken from
the 5th and 20th lower and higher percentiles. Panels A, B, and C present the results when transaction costs are
respectively 0.0%, 0.5%, and 1.0%. The highest return, across di⁄erent strategies, is underlined.
Structural based Structural based EV EV
on shifts con￿rmed on possible shifts [20%, 80%] [5%, 95%]
Tm Hist. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb. Ret. Nb.
m=12 m=6 m=12 m=6
Panel A: Transaction cost = 0.0%
3 12 1.69 2 3.06 2 5.07 19 2.07 10 2.02 14 1.74 4
3 36 0.67 2 2.39 2 5.13 17 2.48 8 1.21 12 0.73 4
3 60 -0.98 2 1.31 2 5.37 13 4.75 8 0.19 8 -0.98 2
5 12 0.78 2 2.77 2 6.77 20 3.20 12 2.34 10 1.96 6
5 36 -0.47 2 2.02 2 7.09 14 3.19 10 1.28 8 1.01 6
5 60 0.34 2 0.82 2 5.16 8 3.25 6 0.54 6 -0.58 4
10 12 -1.59 2 1.80 2 8.51 18 1.84 8 0.65 8 3.40 8
10 36 -3.42 2 0.80 2 6.69 12 0.19 6 -1.09 6 1.60 6
10 60 -3.45 2 -0.80 2 11.58 10 -0.23 4 -2.26 4 0.15 4
Panel B: Transaction cost = 0.5%
3 12 1.68 2 3.05 2 4.98 19 2.02 10 1.24 6 1.41 2
3 36 0.66 2 2.37 2 4.89 15 2.98 8 0.39 4 0.32 2
3 60 -0.99 2 1.29 2 5.27 13 4.69 8 -0.84 2 -0.84 2
5 12 0.77 2 2.76 2 7.44 20 3.14 12 1.34 8 0.28 2
5 36 -0.49 2 2.01 2 7.00 14 3.13 10 0.63 6 -1.09 2
5 60 0.33 2 0.80 2 5.10 8 3.20 6 -0.91 4 -1.71 2
10 12 -1.60 2 1.79 2 6.07 14 1.80 8 1.39 8 3.57 8
10 36 -3.44 2 0.79 2 6.61 12 0.15 6 -0.05 6 1.94 6
10 60 -3.47 2 -0.82 2 11.50 10 1.22 4 -0.70 4 0.77 4
Panel C: Transaction cost = 1.0%
3 12 1.49 2 2.86 2 1.04 8 0.29 6 -0.42 2 1.68 2
3 36 0.42 2 2.14 2 2.20 8 1.89 5 -0.35 2 0.65 2
3 60 -1.31 2 0.97 2 3.65 8 0.65 5 -1.00 2 -1.00 2
5 12 0.58 2 2.57 2 3.76 8 2.32 6 -0.24 4 0.18 2
5 36 -0.72 2 1.77 2 4.55 8 0.89 6 -1.22 2 -1.22 2
5 60 0.01 2 0.48 2 5.70 6 1.72 4 -2.11 2 -1.54 2
10 12 -1.79 2 1.60 2 5.26 10 2.65 8 1.89 8 3.17 8
10 36 0.55 2 0.55 2 5.57 8 0.55 6 -0.04 6 1.56 6





























































































































































































































































40Figure 2: Shifts in the mean for 3-year and 10-year A-rated credit spreads, (1994-2004).
In this ￿gure we plot the time series of 3-year and 10-year A-rated observed credit spreads, the weighted
means of the regimes using the Huber￿ s weight function with h=2 , the Regime Shift Index (RSI). Panel
A presents shifts in the mean without prewhitening and Panel B presents shifts after prewhitening. The
probability for H0 is 0.05, the cut-o⁄ length is 12 months. The estimated AR1 coe¢ cients are, respectively,
0.71 and 0.87 for 3-year and 10-year credit spreads before prewhitening and 0.73 and 0.87 after prewhitening.
The shaded region represents the NBER period of recession.
41Figure 3: Shifts in the variance for 3-year and 10-year A-rated credit spreads, (1994-2004).
In this ￿gure we plot the credit spread residuals (zero-mean) of 3-year and 10-year A-rated credit spreads,
the variance of residuals, and the Residual Sum of Squares Index Sum (RSSI). Panel A presents shifts in
the variance without prewhitening and Panel B presents shifts after prewhitening. The probability for H0
is 0.05 and the cut-o⁄ length is 12 months. The shaded region represents the NBER period of recession.
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